Legal systems generally operate in one of two ways. Systems that are based upon “case law” grant to the judge relative flexibility in legal decisions in various cases, allowing him to use his judgement as required. The judge becomes the exlusive determinant of what is appropriate for every given case. Naturally, it should be clarified that in “case law” systems, the judges are masters of law, and are presumably operating according to legal principles that go beyond individual cases. In other systems, operating according to “statutory law,” parliaments prelegislate the boundaries of legal decisions, so that judges in given cases are bound to implement the law as set down. Even if a judge feels that a given case should be dealt with individually due to extenuating circumstances, his freedom of judgement will be greatly limited. For instance, if a driver is brought before a court for speeding, and the matter is tried according to “case law,” the judge is likely to give careful consideration to extenuating circumstances such as the time of day, the need of the passengers in the car that may have required speeding, etc. The judge may even decide to dismiss the case if he feels the speeding was justified under prevailing conditions. However, if the same case were tried by the same judge according to “statutory law”, the judge would have little leeway, and would be required to fine the driver as prescribed in legislation. Some legal systems combine case law and statutory law, giving varying degrees of independence to the judges.

Written Tradition gives control of the legal system to the judges, and commands all Israel to obey they decisions, even in extreme cases in which it seems that the judges are rendering a judgement contrary to simple logic. In effect, the Torah mandates a system of case law. Tannaim and Amoraim, on the whole, still operate according to case law. It is a fascinating characteristic of tannaitic and amoraic remarks that they rarely, if ever, bring general principles or guiding statutes. Even when verses from the Torah are interpreted, they are understood in given circumstances and not as sweeping generalizations.

Statements of Tannaim and Amoraim generally deal with:
· very specific interpretations of earlier tannaitic or amoraic decisions in order to define the actual case at hand,
· limitations of the application of an earlier decision to certain circumstances,
· legal decisions of their own regarding specific cases.
This case-law environment of amoraic statements may explain why the Rabbis were extremely careful to bring every remark and decision with the name of the responsible amora. After all, the amora himself is the one presenting the logic and application of the specific decision. Also, amoraic traditions are replete with actual case histories and legal narratives that record actual decisions. These case histories and legal narratives are brought with a variety of terminologies, such as "ääåà âáøà ã-", "àé÷ìò ø' ôìåðé ì-" , "ëé àúà ø' ôìåðé àîø..." or variants of the same.

Later, there is a tendency in the Talmud to transpose earlier case law into general principles that may be applied in a wide variety of cases.

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